Browsing by Author "Loi, E"

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    ANSTO Nuclear Foresnics Research Facility: method development and applications
    (Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, 2012-10-16) Wotherspoon, ATL; Hill, DM; Keegan, EA; Evans, T; Blagojevic, N; Loi, E; Toole, K; Griffiths, GJ; Smith, KL; Reinhard, MI
    The IAEA defines nuclear forensic science, commonly shortened to “nuclear forensics” as ‘the scientific analysis of nuclear or other radioactive material, or of other evidence that is contaminated with radioactive material, in the context of legal proceedings, including administrative, civil, criminal or international law’1. In broad terms, the job of the nuclear forensic scientist is to support investigations that involve a nuclear security event. Nuclear forensic examinations will provide information to key questions posed by the investigative authority: What is it? How much is there? Is there any more out there? Is it ours? As an investigation proceeds other questions that may arise are; How old is it? What contaminants are present? Does it pose a threat? Who is responsible for the loss? Where did the material come from? Many of the techniques required to answer these questions are based on environmental radiochemistry. The Nuclear Forensic Research Facility (NFRF) at ANSTO is developing expertise in analysing nuclear and other radioactive material material based upon the precepts of the ‘model action plan’ of the International Technical Working Group for Nuclear Forensics (ITWG) and other best practices. We are also investigating the validity of traditional forensic techniques (like fingerprints and DNA) on evidence contaminated with radioactive material alongside more novel parameters, e.g. the isotopic composition at the ‘bulk’ material and the micro scale using advanced micro-analytical techniques. We are moving towards the integration of a range of radio analytical techniques such as mass spectrometry, electron microscopy and the simulation/modelling of material production signatures, to provide a range of different information streams to assist attribution. With each advance in our technical competencies we enhance our means to ensure the security of nuclear or other radioactive material.
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    The application of radiochronometry during the 4th collaborative materials exercise of the nuclear forensics international technical working group (ITWG)
    (Springer Nature, 2018-02-06) Kristo, MJ; Williams, R; Gaffney, AM; Kayzar-Boggs, TM; Schorzman, KC; Lagerkvist, P; Vesterlund, A; Ramebäck, H; Nelwamondo, AN; Kotze, D; Song, K; Lim, SH; Han, SH; Lee, CG; Okubo, A; Maloubier, D; Cardona, D; Samuleev, P; Dimayuga, I; Varga, Z; Wallenius, M; Mayer, K; Loi, E; Keegan, EA; Harrison, JJ; Thiruvoth, S; Stanley, FE; Spencer, KJ; Tandon, L
    In a recent international exercise, 10 international nuclear forensics laboratories successfully performed radiochronometry on three low enriched uranium oxide samples, providing 12 analytical results using three different parent-daughter pairs serving as independent chronometers. The vast majority of the results were consistent with one another and consistent with the known processing history of the materials. In general, for these particular samples, mass spectrometry gave more accurate and more precise analytical results than decay counting measurements. In addition, the concordance of the 235U–231Pa and 234U–230Th chronometers confirmed the validity of the age dating assumptions, increasing confidence in the resulting conclusions. © 2018 U.S. Government
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    Dissolution of Synroc in deionised water at 150°C
    (Materials Research Society (MRS)/Cambridge University Press/Springer Nature, 1996-02-15) Smith, KL; Colella, M; Thorogood, GJ; Blackford, MG; Lumpkin, GR; Hart, KP; Prince, KE; Loi, E; Jostsons, A
    Synroc containing 20 wt% simulated high level waste (HLW) was subjected to two sets of leach tests at 150°C where the leachant was and was not replaced during the test (replacement and non-replacement testing). The leachant was a KH-phthalate buffered solution (pH 4.2). Samples were characterised before and after leach testing using SEM, AEM and SIMS. Elemental concentrations in leachates were measured using ICP-MS. In concert with the findings of i) a dissolution study of perovskite in a flowing leachant and ii) a previous Synroc dissolution study (wherein Synroc containing 10 wt% simulated HLW was subjected to periodic replacement, leach testing in deionised water at 150°C), the results of this study show that when the leachant replacement frequency is varied from 7 d to the duration of the test, there is no effect on leach rate or leaching mechanisms. © Materials Research Society 1997
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    Nuclear forensic analysis of an unknown uranium ore concentrate sample seized in a criminal investigation in Australia
    (Elsevier, 2014-07) Keegan, EA; Kristo, MJ; Colella, M; Robel, M; Williams, R; Lindvall, R; Eppich, G; Roberts, SK; Borg, L; Gaffney, AM; Plaue, J; Wong, HKY; Davis, J; Loi, E; Reinhard, MI; Hutcheon, I
    Early in 2009, a state policing agency raided a clandestine drug laboratory in a suburb of a major city in Australia. During the search of the laboratory, a small glass jar labelled “Gamma Source” and containing a green powder was discovered. The powder was radioactive. This paper documents the detailed nuclear forensic analysis undertaken to characterise and identify the material and determine its provenance. Isotopic and impurity content, phase composition, microstructure and other characteristics were measured on the seized sample, and the results were compared with similar material obtained from the suspected source (ore and ore concentrate material). While an extensive range of parameters were measured, the key ‘nuclear forensic signatures’ used to identify the material were the U isotopic composition, Pb and Sr isotope ratios, and the rare earth element pattern. These measurements, in combination with statistical analysis of the elemental and isotopic content of the material against a database of uranium ore concentrates sourced from mines located worldwide, led to the conclusion that the seized material (a uranium ore concentrate of natural isotopic abundance) most likely originated from Mary Kathleen, a former Australian uranium mine. © 2014 Elsevier Ireland Ltd.